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Abstract  14 
Private delivery, i.e. contracting out, of maintenance services in urban parks and green 15 
spaces has since the 1980s been spurred by neoliberal reform promises of improved 16 
performance. This article contributes to discussions of whether contracting out park and 17 
green space maintenance services is a well-performing alternative by evaluating what is 18 
known – and not known – about the outcomes in a narrative review of  thirteen studies 19 
bridging experiences from four decades and three country contexts. It is found that the 20 
balance of reported economic and managerial outcomes mostly are on the positive side 21 
while the balance of reported outcomes related to service quality and staff are found to 22 
be on the negative side. Findings indicate that reforms have partly delivered on their 23 
promises. However, the reviewed studies are found to be dominated by evaluations 24 
based on governing values inherent in neoliberal management reforms rather than 25 
alternative management paradigms, rely on older data from a limited number of country 26 
contexts, and lack an accumulated understanding of explanation of outcomes. Finally, 27 
the reviewed studies pay little or no attention to the details of the development of 28 
different contracting and organizational models within contemporary urban green space 29 
management. Future research can expand further on what is known by addressing these 30 
key caveats.  31 
 32 
Keywords  33 
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Introduction 36 
One profound change within local governments’ delivery of maintenance services in 37 
urban parks and green spaces in many countries in the last four decades is a shift toward 38 
greater reliance on private contractors – a shift that simultaneously has challenged and 39 
reduced public authorities’ reliance on in-house provision (Jones, 2000; Lindholst, 40 
2009; Nuppenau, 2009). In a global perspective, the increased reliance on private 41 
contractors in the public sector is one tangible result from the last four decades’ reform 42 
push promoting new organizational and managerial instruments and values based on a 43 
neoliberal belief in ‘markets’ as superior mechanisms for improving the performance of 44 
service delivery (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Hansen and Lindholst, 2016).  45 
Evaluations of whether the promises of neoliberal beliefs have been fulfilled as 46 
well as what the broader outcomes are from the increased reliance on private contractors 47 
for delivery of maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces have been covered 48 
by a small number of studies over the years. The studies have within perspectives 49 
confined to a single country context and particular time periods provided either ‘narrow’ 50 
evaluations of a particular outcome such as difference in expenditure levels (e.g. Jang, 51 
2006) or provided more rounded narratives reporting on a broader set of experiences 52 
and outcomes (e.g. Jones, 2000). However, no research has in a cross-national 53 
perspective within the context of urban green space management gauged what is 54 
hitherto known – and not known – about the outcomes for service delivery from the 55 
increased reliance on private contractors.  56 
 With the aim of illuminating this ‘grander puzzle’, this article provides a review 57 
of internationally available studies reporting on outcomes from public authorities’ use 58 
of contracting out for delivery of maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces 59 
 
4 
 
– a practice that critically has changed who carries out maintenance services in urban 60 
parks and green spaces. The key research question addressed in the article is: what is 61 
known (and not known) in a cross-national perspective about the outcomes for service 62 
delivery from contracting out maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces. 63 
To address the research question, the article first provides an introductory theoretical 64 
overview and discussion of the idea of using contracting out in the public sector for 65 
improving performance, secondly it identifies and review altogether 13 internationally 66 
available studies reporting on outcomes from contracting out maintenance services in 67 
urban parks and green spaces, thirdly it discusses the findings on outcomes against 68 
theory, and fourthly it extrapolates from the findings in the review and pinpoints key 69 
knowledge gaps which should be addressed in future research. The remainder of the 70 
article is structured into four main sections: ‘Theories on contracting out,’ ‘Methods and 71 
materials,’ ‘Review of evidence,’ ‘Discussions,’ and ‘Conclusions.’  72 
 73 
Theories on contracting out 74 
The idea or prescription that private contractors should be systematically involved in 75 
public service delivery with the purpose of improving public sector performance is 76 
associated with the rise of public reforms from the 1970s and onward subsumed under 77 
the heading of ‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood, 1995). As part of its core 78 
values, the NPM has ingrained the wider neoliberal belief that various ‘market-like’ 79 
mechanisms, such as competition, free choice or benchmarking, are superior for 80 
coordinating and organizing public activities (Hansen and Lindholst, 2016). The belief 81 
has been backed by theoretical arguments on the private sector’s comparative ability to 82 
operate more cost-effectively than the public sector due to stronger competitive and 83 
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(profit-based) economic incentives to innovate and bring down operational costs 84 
(Boyne, 1998). Congruently, private contractors have become involved in public service 85 
delivery through a ‘competition model’ for contracting public services (Dehoog, 1990). 86 
In this model, a government is ideally able to specify a service in a formal contract and 87 
through a process of competitive tendering with participation of several potential 88 
providers – public as well as private – contract with the provider that promises to 89 
deliver services at the lowest cost. The model requires (as a minimum) that a 90 
government can spur competition among several qualified providers, has a capacity for 91 
managing and monitoring contracting processes, and can be relatively certain regarding 92 
future funding levels, service needs and service technology. The value of linking a 93 
highly specified set of services with fixed ex ante pricing in a contract will tend to 94 
diminish if change later occurs in, for example, user patterns or planning objectives. The 95 
remedy in many green space maintenance contracts has been to build in a degree of 96 
flexibility (Lindholst, 2009). However, in theory, this approach runs counter to the basic 97 
logic of the low cost-focus inherent in the competition model.  98 
Using markets and contract-based exchange furthermore involves ‘transaction 99 
costs’ for activities ensuring that received values in an exchange relation match 100 
expected values (Ouchi, 1980). These costs include various activities related to 101 
planning, formation and monitoring of service delivery (by contracts). Ultimately, 102 
transaction costs need to be compared across available alternatives for organizing 103 
service delivery. In other words, assessment of the most cost-efficient arrangement for 104 
service delivery requires comparison of the transaction costs associated with each 105 
alternative (Williamson, 1991). However, calculations of comparative transaction costs 106 
are notoriously difficult and seldom fully accounted for in studies of economic 107 
 
6 
 
outcomes from contracting out (Petersen et al., 2017). Hodge (2000) projected that 108 
transaction costs associated with contracting out reduced average cost savings by 109 
around two percentage points. In addition to transaction costs, contracting out may also 110 
result in cost shifts and ‘quasi-market failures’ within the public sector where, for 111 
example, reduced operational expenditures from staff lay-offs or higher productivity 112 
associated with contracting out incur increased expenditures on health and social 113 
welfare elsewhere or years later in the public sector (Boyne 1998). Several other issues 114 
can also be associated with the use of the competition model for service contracting. 115 
Kettl (2010), for example, elaborated on various ‘governance failures’, such as lack of 116 
transparency in money flows, dependency on a single private contractor or lack of 117 
internal contract management capacities, while the theory of ‘incomplete contracts’ 118 
(Hart et al. 1997) highlights that competitive tendering increases providers’ incentives 119 
to offer low prices and/or reduce costs at the expense of quality in service delivery.  120 
 While the ideal case of the competition model seldom can be fully achieved in 121 
practice it is an assumption that governments when possible at least will seek to 122 
maximize economic efficiency in choosing among potential providers (Dehoog, 1990). 123 
The competition model is usually expected to work better for some services than others. 124 
Characteristics of parks and green space maintenance are in comparisons with other 125 
public services commonly regarded as relatively well-suited for contracting out. A US 126 
based study by Hefetz and Warner (2012), for example, found that contracting out of 127 
park and landscape maintenance was characterized by higher competition levels, and 128 
lower levels of contracting difficulties and investment requirements in comparison with 129 
other municipal services. However, a relatively higher citizen interest in park services 130 
indicated some caveats, as higher citizen interest is likely to require higher levels of 131 
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ongoing government coordination and control in order to ensure responsiveness toward 132 
community needs. Based on the comparative characteristics, it can be argued that the 133 
competitive model of contracting out can be expected to work relatively well for parks 134 
and green space maintenance services in relation to economic performance but less so in 135 
relation to other important aspects.  136 
The competitive model of service contracting furthermore ingrains a distinct set 137 
of governing values. The neoliberal belief in the market as a superior coordination 138 
mechanism has through the NPM promoted core values in the public sector related to 139 
competition, cost-effectiveness and productivity. Patterson and Pinch (1995), for 140 
example, observed that the implementation of contracting out in the UK encompassed 141 
an organizational shift toward ‘strategic centralization and operational decentralization’ 142 
as well as a shift toward a business and commercial discourse focused on ‘efficiency’, 143 
‘performance targets’ and ‘consumer needs.’ These values seem somehow odd or differ 144 
from traditional bureaucratic values, such as legality and procedural fairness supporting 145 
a ‘public ethos’, as well as governing values promoted in management paradigms in 146 
newer reform trends such as involvement, deliberation and flexibility in decentralized 147 
searches of ‘public value’ within networks of stakeholders (Hood, 1991; Stoker, 2006). 148 
With the point of departure in alternative sets of governing values the performance of 149 
contracting out can be judged very differently. For example, one longstanding criticism 150 
in the literature of the competitive model of service contracting is the loss of democratic 151 
deliberation and political control (Vincent-Jones, 2007) – or what have been called a 152 
process of ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1994). In the competition model private 153 
contractors are intentionally engaged to deliver contracted services at the lowest 154 
possible costs whereas in-house providers are directly governed by their political 155 
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constituencies within a hierarchical structure and can recurrently be required to serve 156 
broader public purposes within a community or adapt to changing political preferences. 157 
It follows that service delivery through in-house organizations is governed by a 158 
different – if not more complex – set of values than the values governing the use of 159 
private contractors through a competition model. In the institutional literature on 160 
economic organization the difference between organizing production through markets 161 
(‘buy’) versus hierarchies (‘make’) has been analysed in terms of comparative benefits 162 
and costs (Williamson 1991). In-house provision may have advantages such as greater 163 
‘allocative’ efficiency (e.g. flexibility and ability to meet changing community needs 164 
and user preferences) while contracting out may have the advantage in terms of greater 165 
‘technical’ efficiency (plan and provide standard services at the lower cost).  166 
 The differences between in-house and market based approaches as well as how 167 
contracting out is organized may, however, not be as clear cut as analytical models 168 
suggest. New models for contracting out serving other purposes than cost-effectiveness 169 
have been introduced through shifts in reform focus in some countries, such as the UK 170 
(Boyne, 1999), as well as discussed more broadly as an international trend in the 171 
literature (Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Vincent-Jones 2007, Donahue and Zeckhauser, 172 
2006). The new models include various partnership and collaborative approaches 173 
supporting objectives related to service development, public deliberation, flexibility and 174 
transformation rather than mere cost concerns. The focus on new models has also been 175 
reflected within urban green space management where alternative contractual 176 
arrangements, incorporating partnership features in various degrees, have emerged since 177 
the early 2000s (Lindholst, 2009).  178 
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 The upshot is that evaluations of outcomes from contracting out can have points 179 
of departure in very different sets of values which illuminate different comparative 180 
advantages and disadvantages of various arrangements for service delivery – and very 181 
different conclusions may arise from the chosen approach. 182 
 183 
Methods and materials 184 
Materials for the review were partly identified by a systematic key-word based search 185 
on the web of science database and partly by ‘show-balling’ within two streams of 186 
literature. Identified materials were first screened for any inclusion or reference to 187 
maintenance services with relevance for urban green spaces, e.g. park or grounds 188 
maintenance. Secondly, each title was reviewed for any reported evidence on outcomes 189 
related to private provision of maintenance services. Thirdly, the originality and 190 
credibility of the evidence were reviewed by assessment of methods and data supporting 191 
any reported outcome. A few titles were excluded in the third stage due to either severe 192 
methodological flaws (e.g. Greene, 1994) or a more commentary-oriented character of a 193 
title (e.g. Hebbert, 2008). The final list of all relevant materials for the review included 194 
13 titles.  195 
The search in the web of science (within the social science and emerging 196 
indices) used a syntax including: contract* OR privati* OR outsour* AND green* OR 197 
park* OR ground* AND maintenance. The search generated 698 unique hits. Inspection 198 
of titles and abstracts reduced the number of relevant titles to only three. In the show-199 
balling two streams of research were inspected. The first stream comprised reviews of 200 
outcomes from contracting out in the public sector by Borcherding et al. (1982), 201 
Donahue (1989), Hirsch (1995), Domberger (1997), Boyne (1998), Hodge (2000) and 202 
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Petersen et al. (2017). The second stream consisted of existing studies of contracting out 203 
within park and green space management in local governments including titles by Jones 204 
(2000), Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp (2009), Lindholst and Bogetoft (2011), Jansson 205 
and Lindgren (2012) and Lindholst et al. (2015). Inspection of the titles resulted in 206 
altogether 10 relevant studies for the review.  207 
Given the broader scope of the research, a ‘narrative’ approach was adapted for 208 
the review (Green et al., 2006). A narrative approach allows for more detailed accounts 209 
of reviewed evidence rather than summaries in either qualitative (e.g. summary of 210 
positive or negative outcomes) or quantitative (e.g. calculation of effect sizes) terms. 211 
Based on the narrative approach, the 13 titles identified in the literature search were 212 
inspected and summarized through an inductive analytical process with regard to 1) any 213 
findings on outcomes related to contracting out of park and green space maintenance 214 
(reported outcomes), 2) any findings or discussion on factors which explain the reported 215 
outcomes (explanations for outcomes), 3) the methods sustaining any finding or 216 
conclusion (methods), and 4) contextual details of the studies (context).  217 
 218 
Review of evidence 219 
Table 1 provides a chronological overview of the titles, including reported outcomes, 220 
any stated explanations for outcomes, the methods and finally the country context of the 221 
data.  222 
 223 
*** Insert table 1 around here *** 224 
 225 
The 13 studies in short 226 
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The 13 studies covered data from a timespan of approximately three decades (1982-227 
2015) and included a limited number of country / regional contexts. The country 228 
contexts included: USA (three studies), England and Wales (five studies), and 229 
Scandinavia (five studies). With a few exceptions, the studies tended to focus on only 230 
one or two key outcomes. Eleven studies reported on economic effects, eight studies 231 
reported on effects on service quality, five studies reported on effects on management 232 
and organization, while five studies reported on staff related effects.  233 
Altogether ten studies reported statistics as part of their key findings while three 234 
studies reported findings in terms of qualitative accounts. In terms of data, seven studies 235 
were purely quantitative, two studies were purely qualitative while four studies were 236 
based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Key data sources across the studies 237 
included surveys and research interviews with key stakeholders while register-based 238 
data and expert assessments were used in a few studies only.  239 
 240 
Economic outcomes 241 
Seven out of the 13 studies found cost reductions as a major (positive) outcome. Six of 242 
these seven studies also indicated improved technical efficiency, i.e. the same service 243 
level was provided at lower costs. Two studies found no significant differences in 244 
service expenditure levels between contracting and non-contracting municipalities. One 245 
study found substantial cost increases in contract prices while one study found that the 246 
likelihood of no cost change was substantially higher than the chance for cost savings.  247 
Studies by Berenyi and Stevens (1988), Walsh and Davis (1993), and Lindholst 248 
(2008) which measured cost change at the level of individual contracts all found that 249 
contracting out was associated with cost savings, on balance. Walsh and Davis (1993) 250 
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found that for 69 cases the shift from provision of grounds maintenance by direct 251 
services organizations (in-house) to contracting out had resulted in an average cost 252 
reduction by a magnitude of 10.9 percent (with a standard deviation around 15 253 
perrcent). Berenyi and Stevens (1988) found that municipal provision of, respectively, 254 
street tree and turf maintenance were respectively 27 percent and 29 percent  cheaper 255 
than private provision in a statistical analysis of 20 municipalities where other factors 256 
such as scale and quality were held constant. In a study of a Danish state agency’s 257 
contracting practices, Lindholst (2008) reported that a 34 percent  cost saving on overall 258 
expenditures on maintenance operations was realized though introduction of contracting 259 
out and successive rounds of procurement without compromised service levels and 260 
quality of service delivery. Studies by Jones (2000) and Nuppenau (2009) based on 261 
qualitative / narrative accounts of effects in multiple case studies of local governments 262 
in, respectively, England and Denmark also reported cost savings as a key outcome 263 
from the introduction of contracting out. Two US studies by, respectively, Martin and 264 
Stein (1992) and Jang (2006), which measured cost differences at the level of overall 265 
municipal expenditures and provided analysis based on statistical analysis of 266 
quantitative data, did not find any statistically significant association between 267 
contracting levels and spending levels. Clark (1997) found that 71 percent  of 268 
responding UK local authorities reported that ‘better value for tax payers’ was achieved 269 
from contacting out versus 25 percent  reporting that this was not the case. The study by 270 
Leiren et al. (2016) found highly negative economic outcomes in terms of substantial 271 
cost increases for Norwegian municipalities from their latest use of competitive 272 
tendering, while the study by Bretzer et al. (2016) found that the likelihood of no cost 273 
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change in competitive tendering was substantially higher for Swedish municipalities 274 
than the chance for cost savings.  275 
Across the studies, the key explanatory factors for economic outcomes 276 
encompassed references to ‘competition’, ‘change in standards/quality levels’, ‘higher 277 
private productivity’ and ‘government objectives’.  278 
Competition. In almost all studies the introduction of competition was theorized 279 
to be a key driver of improved economic performance. The study by Martin and Stein 280 
(1992), for example, provided a direct empirical test of the importance of competition / 281 
contracting levels for cost levels and found that contracting out was significantly related 282 
to (slightly) lower levels of spending. However, further decreases in spending levels 283 
from additional contracting beyond 25 percent  of all municipal services were found to 284 
be insignificant. The studies of, respectively, Norwegian and Swedish municipalities by 285 
Leiren et al. (2016) and Bretzer et al. (2016) also indicated that competition varied 286 
according to geography and administrative structures. Both country contexts are 287 
characterized by many very small municipalities scattered over vast geographical areas. 288 
In this context, competition – as well as the level of contracting out – was higher in the 289 
more densely populated metropolitan areas.    290 
Higher private productivity. All reviewed studies implicitly or explicitly stated 291 
that productivity, i.e. producing the same output with fewer inputs, was higher in the 292 
private sector than in the public sector. Walsh and Davis (1993), for example, reported 293 
that among park managers it was believed that a key reason for cost reductions was 294 
relatively higher private sector productivity. The reported cost savings by Lindholst 295 
(2008) were attributed to a shift to full-scale contracting out and the abolition of a 296 
former ineffective and poorly managed in-house arrangement. From findings in studies 297 
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by Berenyi and Stevens (1988) or Patterson and Pinch (1995) it is also evident that 298 
higher private productivity has been achieved by substantial changes in the number of 299 
employees, employee composition, work conditions and workforce management.  300 
Change in service levels. Some studies prompted the importance of change in 301 
service levels as a direct driver of cost change in contracting out. For example, Walsh 302 
and Davis (1993) found a key reason for a part of the reported cost reductions was 303 
changes toward lower standards for service quality while the main source for cost 304 
increases was reported to be changes toward higher standards. 305 
Government objectives. Based on the studies by Martin and Stein (1992), 306 
Patterson and Pinch (1995) and Jones (2000), it can furthermore be argued that pursuit 307 
of general government objectives in terms of cost reductions in contracting practices is a 308 
key explanatory factor for the observed effects. In particular, it can be argued that 309 
contracting out has been used as a means through which governments implement an 310 
objective of cost reduction (as well as objectives related to reducing the number of staff 311 
in public organizations). This is perhaps most evident in the policies on compulsory 312 
competitive tendering in the UK which provided a tight regulation of the use of 313 
contracting out as a clear cost-reducing mechanism (Dempsey et al., 2016). A special 314 
case, which also illuminates the importance of taking objectives into account, is the 315 
study of contracting out in Norwegian municipalities by Leiren et al. (2016). The study 316 
found that the overriding reason for private service provision was a lack of in-house 317 
capacity rather than cost concerns.  318 
 319 
Service outcomes 320 
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Four studies reported overall neutral effects on service quality while four studies 321 
reported negative effects and one study indicated positive effects on service quality. 322 
Studies by Lindholst (2008), Berenyi and Stevens (1988), Walsh and Davis (1993) and 323 
Clark (1997) found no overall negative direct effect on service quality. Walsh and Davis 324 
(1993) found few reports of declining quality as an effect of contracting out. However, 325 
changes in service standards were reported to affect cost levels (see above). Clark 326 
(1997) found that 36percent  of responding local authorities reported that quality levels 327 
had decreased compared to 37 percent  who reported that reported that quality levels 328 
had increased. The two studies by Jones (2000) and Lindholst et al. (2015) reported 329 
negative effects on service quality and they in particular indicated problems with 330 
allocative efficiency, i.e. overall functionality of parks and their ability to satisfy user 331 
needs, within public service delivery systems. The study by Jones (2000) found that 332 
service levels / quality had generally declined by contracting out in the era of 333 
compulsory competitive tendering in the UK and created run down and derelict park 334 
areas low in horticultural and recreational value. Jones (2000) attributed that decline 335 
partly to ‘making parks fit for mowers rather than mowers fit the needs of the park’ as 336 
well as to a loss of community contact by shifts from site-based staff toward mobile 337 
work gangs. The study by Lindholst et al. (2015) pointed out that service specifications 338 
adopted for contracting out of grounds maintenance have drawbacks, as they tend to 339 
limit the view on service quality to a question about compliance to pre-predefined 340 
technical measures based on horticultural knowledge, rather than enabling integration of 341 
broader stakeholder views on what services are – or should be – about. In consequence, 342 
contracting out has resulted in implementation of managerial arrangements with limited 343 
scope for democratic deliberation – i.e. limited scope for alignment of resource use with 344 
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broader community or user preferences. Leiren et al. (2016) provided a comparison of 345 
satisfaction levels with performance of public and private provision and found that 346 
satisfaction levels with public provision compared to private provision were 347 
significantly higher for three out of six measures. However, the difference may be a 348 
result of differences in the type of maintenance services, as the Norwegian 349 
municipalities mostly used private contractors for provision of services they could not 350 
provide themselves. Dempsey et al. (2016) found that satisfaction levels with private 351 
provision among English local authorities on the average were surprisingly high 352 
compared to the legacy of contracting out from the era of compulsory competitive 353 
tendering in the 1980s and 1990s.  354 
The explanations for quality effects stated in the reviewed studies related to 355 
organizational changes in service delivery systems in which contracting out is 356 
introduced. The changes related to new organization of operational staff, the 357 
operationalization of services in order to comply with formal management systems and 358 
rationalizations based on available organizational capacities (e.g. ‘making parks fit for 359 
mowers’). Walsh and Davis (1993) and Nuppenau (2009), for example, reported that 360 
service standards in many cases did not exist prior to the introduction of competitive 361 
contracting. In an extended argument, Lindholst et al. (2015) found that the use of 362 
particular standards for defining services in accordance with the requirement for 363 
contracting out has introduced and entrenched a particular way of thinking about and 364 
making decisions on ‘quality’ in urban park management. This ‘mindset’ was suggested 365 
to be more occupied with serving professional needs rather than addressing broader 366 
service needs.  367 
 368 
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Managerial and organizational outcomes 369 
Both negative and positive outcomes for managerial and organizational performance 370 
were reported in studies by Clark (1997), Jones (2000), Lindholst (2008), Nuppenau 371 
(2009) and Lindholst et al. (2015).  372 
Clark (1997) found that park managers reported increased difficulties with 373 
service monitoring by implementation of contracting out but at the same time also that 374 
service monitoring had become more ‘effective’ for most local authorities. Jones (2000) 375 
reported several managerial improvements from the implementation of contracting out 376 
such as standardization of work activities and service levels across locations and 377 
creation of information and resource systems for improved centralized management and 378 
decision-making. Correspondingly, Lindholst (2008) found that management of ground 379 
maintenance services had become more effective by the introduction of a tougher 380 
contract management regime based on ‘high-powered’ (economic) incentives for 381 
managing externally provided services. However, the shift toward a tougher 382 
management regime also left important issues aside related to day-to-day flexibility and 383 
collaboration. Nuppenau (2009) reported that competitive tendering improved internal 384 
management and organisation by implementation of new managerial tools, such as 385 
performance targets, and by spurring staff to innovate and perform better. Lindholst et 386 
al. (2015) found that development of quality standards based on horticultural knowledge 387 
supported cost-effective service delivery through the use of competitive tendering, but 388 
also unintentionally limited the scope for public deliberation.  389 
Across the studies, the introduction of new management tools associated with 390 
contracting out provided a major explanatory factor for reported effects on management 391 
and organization. As found by Nuppenau (2009), new management tools have also been 392 
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applied and improved management of in-house organizations. An important caveat, 393 
noted in the study by Clark (1997), is that improved management depends on contract 394 
management capability and lacking capabilities may result in ineffective management of 395 
service delivery.   396 
 397 
Staff outcomes 398 
Studies by Berenyi and Stevens (1988), Patterson and Pinch (1995), Clark (1997), Jones 399 
(2000) and Nuppenau (2009) provided evidence on the impact on staff. Overall, the 400 
reported effects are negative with the exception of mixed effects reported by Nuppenau 401 
(2009). 402 
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) found that contracting out compared to in-house 403 
provision involved several differences in personnel practices including lower levels of 404 
absenteeism, a younger workforce, a lower level of fringe benefits, lower average age 405 
and tenure, easier access to hiring and firing, shorter distance between management and 406 
direct labour as well as a general lower level of labour costs among private contractors 407 
compared to municipal organizations. Patterson and Pinch (1995) found that the policy 408 
of compulsory competitive tendering in the UK had led to substantial reductions in both 409 
public and private workforces as well as deteriorating employment terms and conditions 410 
within a labour market characterized by lower wages and more precarious working 411 
conditions. In perspective, Patterson and Pinch (1995) observed that implementation of 412 
contracting out had resulted in ‘a separation of a concern for the services to be provided 413 
from a concern for those people who will provide that service’. Congruently, Clark 414 
(1997) found that staff training was not included in the vast majority of ground 415 
maintenance contracts in the UK in the mid-1990s, and Jones (2000) reported a lack of 416 
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investment in and loss of the sector’s skills base as well as loss of initiative, morale and 417 
creative flair in the workforce. Nuppenau (2009) found, however, mixed effects on in-418 
house operational staff exposed to competitive pressures in Danish municipal 419 
organizations. On the negative side, change processes related to contracting out were 420 
reported to be experienced by staff as ‘a time of resistance, scepticism, anxiety and 421 
insecurity’. On the positive side, Nuppenau (2009) found that new performance 422 
standards and organization of work were helpful in generating learning, sharing 423 
experience and motivating work efforts among staff.  424 
A summary of the provided explanations for reported effects on staff includes 425 
introduction of competitive organizational environments, substantial differences in 426 
management and employment terms as well as workforce composition between the 427 
public and private sector, weaker managerial concerns for staff in disaggregated 428 
organizations based on a purchaser-provider models, and underinvestment in staff 429 
training.  430 
 431 
Discussion 432 
The reported outcomes were summarized under headings for effects on economy, 433 
service quality, management and organization, and staff. Reported outcomes of positive, 434 
neutral and negative kinds were observed. The list of positive outcomes included: cost 435 
savings at the level of contracts, improved technical efficiency, more effective 436 
management and monitoring, learning and motivation. The list of negative outcomes 437 
included: declining service quality, lacking public participation and democratic 438 
deliberation, disengaged staff, loss of professional skills, and a reduced workforce. 439 
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Neutral outcomes / no effects included, for example, no impact on service quality or no 440 
overall change in expenditure levels for park services.  441 
 442 
**** Insert Table 2 around here **** 443 
 444 
Table 2 provides a summary of the instances of positive, neutral and negative outcomes 445 
reported for the four types of outcomes. A finding is that the overall evaluation of 446 
outcomes is mixed. However, the tendencies are that reports on economic and 447 
managerial/organizational outcomes on balance are positive while reports on service 448 
and staff on balance are negative. Most instances of reported outcomes are, furthermore, 449 
counted as economic outcomes (12 instances), followed by service outcomes (nine 450 
instances), managerial/organizational outcomes (seven instances) and outcomes for staff 451 
(five instances). 452 
 Across the reviewed studies it was notable that explanations for the various 453 
outcomes were not systematically addressed or discussed and only a single study by 454 
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) included systematic research on the reasons for 455 
performance differences between  public and private provision. Thus, the reviewed 456 
studies themselves do not provide a systematic accumulation of a deeper or more 457 
refined understanding of why and under which circumstances various outcomes occur. 458 
However, by summarizing the various explanations reported across the reviewed 459 
studies, some hypothetical associations can be established. Table 3 provides a summary 460 
of all reported explanations and their main association with the four types of outcomes 461 
across the 13 studies.  462 
 463 
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*** Insert table 3 around here *** 464 
 465 
Across the studies, introduction of competition, relative effectiveness of private 466 
contractors (i.e. private ownership) and cost-focused contracting policies were 467 
predominant explanations for the various outcomes. Cost reductions were in some 468 
studies, e.g. Berenyi and Stevens (1988) or Patterson and Pinch (1995), found or argued 469 
to be a result of lower wages and workforce reductions driven by differences between 470 
public and private sector management as well as overall competitive pressures. 471 
Introduction of new management systems (e.g. service standards) as part of the 472 
requirements for implementing contracting out were also a recurrent explanation across 473 
several studies, e.g. Clark (1997) or Lindholst (2008), for managerial and organizational 474 
outcomes. However, in order to improve the understanding of the drivers for various 475 
outcomes a recommendation for future research is to address the various explanations in 476 
more systematic approaches.  477 
The reviewed studies reported on outcomes from a limited range of country 478 
contexts. The three contexts in the reviewed evidence included the UK, the US and the 479 
three Scandinavian countries. The limited number of country contexts limits how far 480 
results can be generalized. Each country context embeds particular historical path 481 
dependencies in reform orientation – or governance traditions – which are likely to 482 
influence both reform aims and outcomes (Rhodes, 1999). Adding to the complexities 483 
of country context are the policy shifts or incremental institutional changes which can 484 
be observed over time within a country context. The relatively high number of reviewed 485 
studies from the UK based on data from the 1990s (four out of a total of five UK based 486 
studies), for example, infuses a certain bias in the overall evidence base toward the 487 
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intricacies of the implementation of contracting out in the UK context. In an 488 
international comparison, it is critical to note that the shift toward greater reliance on 489 
private contractors in the UK in the 1990s was spurred by tight and cost-focused 490 
regulations for compulsory use of competitive tendering in local authorities (Clark, 491 
1997) – a policy abandoned by the end of the 1990s in a shift to a more flexible and 492 
strategic approach to service provision based on a broader idea of ‘best value’ (Boyne, 493 
1999). In contrast, more flexible and pragmatic policies have been implemented in 494 
Scandinavia (e.g. Leiren et al., 2016; Lindholst et al., 2016). Given the policy context in 495 
the UK in the 1990s it is no surprise that the three studies based in data for this period 496 
all found that contracting out resulted in improved economic performance in terms of 497 
either cost reductions (Walsh and Davis, 1993; Jones, 2000) or better value for money 498 
(Clark, 1997). To gauge further the importance of country (and policy) context, a 499 
recommendation for future research is to expand the number of country contexts. 500 
Beyond a requirement to balance the potential bias from particularities of country 501 
context, it is also of inherent interest to see how alternative arrangements for providing 502 
maintenance in urban parks and green spaces perform in additional country contexts. 503 
 In the section on theories of contracting out it was highlighted that outcomes can 504 
be evaluated from different sets of governing values embedded in different management 505 
paradigms. The reviewed evidence was dominated by studies which took as their point 506 
of departure values associated with the neoliberal reform agenda. This dominance was 507 
reflected, for example, in the majority of studies addressing whether cost-savings have 508 
been achieved – a question clearly associated with the NPM. Furthermore, some of the 509 
reviewed studies reporting on improved management/organization referred to 510 
managerial dimensions of relevance to key values in the NPM. For example, the shift 511 
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toward contracting out was reported to be an improvement in the performance of 512 
centralised and formal management practices in studies by Jones (2000) and Lindholst 513 
(2008). However, strategic centralization in the management of public activities is a key 514 
feature of NPM and its improvement may come at the expense of a loss of the capacity 515 
for decentralized and responsive management within local networks– an important 516 
capacity for implementation of more collaborative and deliberative oriented reforms. In 517 
other words, the improved performance in management is reported from the perspective 518 
of a particular set of governing values rather than an evaluation of the outcomes seen 519 
from the perspective of alternative management paradigms. Overall, only limited 520 
evidence was found which took point of departure in the governing values associated 521 
with other major paradigms for managing and organizing the public sector. The studies 522 
by Lindholst et al. (2015) and Jones (2000), for example, reported on losses in the 523 
capacity and flexibility to addresses and satisfy user needs – key values related to 524 
reform trends based on ideas of governance including public involvement and 525 
democratic deliberation. Other studies reporting on losses in the skill-base, e.g. Clark 526 
(1997), Patterson and Pinch (1995) or Jones (2000), also provided some evidence on 527 
detrimental effects from contracting out on the function of organizational models based 528 
on more traditional administrative values related to professionalism and robustness. It is 529 
a recommendation for future research to provide more rounded evaluations which 530 
explicitly illuminate and evaluate outcomes from the viewpoints of the different 531 
governing values inherent in alternative management paradigms.   532 
None of the reviewed studies compared or distinguished between different 533 
approaches to contracting out in their links to outcomes. The introduction of 534 
collaborative approaches to contracting out in urban green space management the 2000s 535 
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has hosted a strategic focus in public-private relations related to service development 536 
and changes/improvements in managerial approach (Lindholst, 2009). Earlier studies 537 
have called for such approaches in order to mitigate perceived flaws of earlier 538 
approaches to contracting out (e.g. Jones, 2000; Lindholst, 2008; Dempsey and Burton, 539 
2012). However, the reviewed studies do not shed any light on whether newer 540 
collaborative approaches perform differently than long-standing standard approaches 541 
grounded in the competition model. Even newer studies in the review, e.g. Dempsey et 542 
al. (2016) or Leiren et al. (2016), confined reports on outcomes to the relative 543 
performance between private and in-house provision as the two main alternatives. A 544 
recommendation for future research is to pay attention to the details of different 545 
contractual and organizational arrangements and their comparative performance.  546 
 Another main finding from the review is the relatively high share of the studies 547 
reporting positive economic outcomes—a finding apparently indicating that one key 548 
promise of NPM, i.e. improved economic performance, has been fulfilled by the shift 549 
toward greater reliance on private delivery. However, some caveats must be raised. 550 
None of the reviewed studies considered potential off-setting effects from, for example, 551 
cost shifts in the public sector or the size of comparative transaction costs. This is a 552 
recurrent and longstanding critique of studies of the economic performance of 553 
contracting out in the public sector (Boyne, 1998; Petersen et al. 2017). Some of these 554 
effects, in particular comparative transaction costs, are implicitly accounted for in the 555 
group of reviewed studies comparing overall expenditure levels for park services 556 
between municipalities with different levels of contracting out (e.g. Martin and Stein, 557 
1992). On the other hand, these studies may again fail to account for any re-allocation 558 
or re-investment within park services, e.g. new facilities, of potential cost gains from 559 
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contracting out maintenance services. Earlier estimates of transaction costs associated 560 
with contracting out in the public sector more generally indicate that their magnitude (a 561 
two per cent point reduction in the level of estimated cost savings) is certainly not 562 
tipping the overall balance of economic performance (Hodge, 2000).  563 
Studies comparing the economic performance from contracting out the first 564 
time, i.e. a shift from public to private provision, may also to some degree compare 565 
service provision of public and private organizations which differ in their comparative 566 
advantages and disadvantages as well as governing values. The introduction of 567 
competitive tendering and shifts from public to private provision has historically 568 
implied a change from one type of organization to another. Clark (1997), for example, 569 
noted that public providers in local governments in the UK prior to the implementation 570 
of the UK based versions of NPM reforms were characterized by a unitary and skill-571 
based organization based on horticultural (and arboricultural) knowledge and low 572 
degrees of formalization of managerial systems. Consequently, public organizations 573 
were abruptly situated in competition with private organizations whose business culture 574 
was already closely aligned with the governing values, such as cost-efficiency and 575 
productivity, inherent in the NPM. In Scandinavia, however, municipal park 576 
management witnessed a more incremental and pragmatic approach to the introduction 577 
of competition and private contractors in the 1990s and 2000s where public 578 
organizations were able to prepare themselves for potential exposure to competition 579 
(e.g. Nuppenau, 2009). Generically, the two types of organization, i.e. the private 580 
contractor and the traditional public provider, can be contrasted as a difference between 581 
their orientations toward, respectively, ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ as well as a difference 582 
between organizational values related to, respectively, ‘robustness’ and ‘efficiency’ (see 583 
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also Hood, 1991). In other words, the improved cost-efficiency reported in several of 584 
the reviewed studies may have come at the disadvantage of organizational robustness as 585 
well as being detrimental to the governing values inherent in alternative management 586 
paradigms (as discussed above). Such dynamics are reflected in the earlier critique 587 
within the UK context of the (massive) losses in skills, i.e. organizational robustness, 588 
due to the implementation of competitive tendering in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Jones, 589 
2000). However, as found by Nuppenau (2009) in an Scandinavian conetxt, municipal 590 
provider organizations have over time become ‘marketized’ by incorporation of new 591 
management systems such as service standards, resource management and cost-based 592 
accounting principles, or business plans. In other words, public and private provider 593 
organizations have become – at least in some countries – more alike due to the NPM. 594 
The dynamics in the internal organizational development of in-house providers indicate 595 
that earlier studies have compared the (economic) performance of very different 596 
organizations while later studies have compared organizations that were more alike. In 597 
perspective, generalizations forward in time of findings in earlier studies may come 598 
with some caveats as well as the organizational dynamics toward convergence (also) 599 
motivate a call fort new studies based on contemporary data.  600 
Finally, across the reviewed studies it was found that research has relied on a 601 
mix of qualitative and quantitative data, collected from secondary and primary data 602 
sources in terms of register-based repositories, expert evaluations, surveys and 603 
interviews as well as different analytical methods ranging from longitudinal case studies 604 
based on narrative accounts toward application of multivariate statistical analysis. Given 605 
the relatively small number of studies, the represented materials and methods are quite 606 
heterogeneous and complementary in character. Given well-known strengths and 607 
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weaknesses of different research designs, no particular recommendation for future 608 
research designs can be provided from the review beyond the substantial call raised in 609 
the foregoing discussions for updating the evidence base by inclusion of further country 610 
contexts, contemporary data, more systematic explorations of explanatory factors, and 611 
more detailed differentiation between various alternatives for providing maintenance 612 
services.  613 
 614 
Conclusion 615 
This article provided a review of what was known – and not known – about the 616 
outcomes from contracting out maintenance services in urban parks and green spaces. 617 
The review was based on an analysis of altogether 13 internationally available studies 618 
with regard to type of reported outcomes, explanations for outcomes, methodological 619 
basis and country context. The studies covered data from a timespan of four decades 620 
and three major country contexts. Four major outcome types – economic, service, 621 
management/organisation and staff – were found to be illuminated in the reviewed 622 
studies. Economic and managerial performance tended to be evaluated as positive while 623 
outcomes for service quality and staff tended to be evaluated as negative.  624 
The evaluation of what is known about the outcomes was, however, to some 625 
extent flawed or influenced by the particularities of country and policy context in the 626 
reviewed studies. The review furthermore found that what is known mostly relates to 627 
questions raised from a NPM perspective. In other words, contracting out has mostly 628 
been evaluated for its merits (or perils) in terms of economic performance. The merits 629 
seen from other managerial perspectives and their inherent governing values, for 630 
example democratic deliberation or legal compliance, were more scarcely covered or 631 
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not covered at all. Thus, the evidence is somehow ‘flawed’ toward the particular set of 632 
governing values associated with the NPM perspective. Furthermore, even evaluations 633 
of contracting outcomes with a point of departure in a NPM perspective were to some 634 
extent flawed. For example, comparable transaction costs or cost shifts in the public 635 
sector were not explicitly addressed in studies reporting estimates on economic 636 
outcomes.  637 
Finally, the reviewed studies did not distinguish between different alternative 638 
approaches to contracting out. This should be of less concern for findings from early 639 
studies based on data from the 1990s, or earlier, where a tighter alignment with a 640 
competitive model can be assumed. Given the introduction of collaborative approaches 641 
to contracting out from the early 2000s and onward it has become of increasing interest 642 
to distinguish between alternative approaches to involvement of the private contractors 643 
and their comparative performance. This development should be seen as parallel to the 644 
organizational reform and development of in-house providers in the same period. In 645 
other words, the organization and performance of contemporary private contractors and 646 
in-house providers are likely to be very different than four decades ago.  647 
 In perspective, the review found that what is known about the outcomes from 648 
contracting out in a cross-country perspective is limited in important respects. Future 649 
research is needed and may expand on what is known by addressing knowledge gaps 650 
by, for example, expanding the number of country and policy contexts, seeking to 651 
connect and accumulate evidence on the explanations for reported outcomes, pay 652 
attention to different contracting and organizational models as well as take point of 653 
departure in a wider set of governance values than those ingrained in neoliberal reform 654 
approaches.  655 
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TABLE 1. Chronological overview on studies on outcomes from contracting out maintenance services in parks and urban green spaces.  
Reference Reported key outcome(s) Explanatory factors  Methods 
Country 
context 
Berenyi 
and 
Stevens 
(1988) 
Delivery of street trees and turf maintenance 
respectively 27% and 29% cheaper in 
municipalities with private delivery compared to 
public delivery. Estimates controlled for service 
levels and quality.    
Less labour intensive 
organization. Lower salaries. 
More direct control with 
manpower and use of technical 
equipment. Different 
characteristics of employees and 
employment. 
Statistical analysis (OLS regression 
with controls) of the comparable 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
street tree and turf maintenance 
between public and private 
provision based on quantitative 
data (year 1984) from on 20 cities.  
USA 
Martin 
and Stein  
(1992) 
Insignificant relationship between contracting 
out and overall expenditures on maintenance 
operations. 
Theoretical considerations about 
governments’ need to reduce 
costs and number of public 
employees. 
Statistical analysis (OLS regression 
with controls) of service provisions 
in 877 local authorities based on 
available survey data from 1982-
1983. 
USA 
Walsh and 
Davis  
(1993) 
Cost saving (average 10%) and some 
improvement in technical efficiency for services 
contracted out (e.g. no impact on service 
quality).  
Improved productivity and 
changes (increase/decrease) in 
work standards. 
Descriptive analysis of survey-data 
(1989-1992) for eight local services, 
including 69 grounds maintenance 
contracts sampled from 40 local 
authorities. 
England 
and Wales 
Patterson 
and Pinch  
(1995) 
Estimated average reductions in staff about 32% 
for private and 13% for public providers. 
Organizational change toward ‘strategic 
centralization’ and ‘operational 
decentralization’  
Legislative requirements.  
Cost-focused contracting 
policies. 
Narrative account based on various 
secondary data sources and 
available official statistics.  
England 
and Wales 
Clark  
(1997) 
Improved value for tax payers and improved 
monitoring reported in a majority of local 
governments (no estimates for effect size 
provided). 
Not discussed. Descriptive analysis of survey data 
(collected in 1996) based on 268 
responses (response rate 53%) 
from local governments in England 
and Wales. 
England 
and Wales 
Jones  
(2000) 
Improved information level on assets, costs and 
service levels. Reduced production costs. 
Decreased standards and quality of services. 
Tight and cost-focused 
contracting policies. 
Retrospective longitudinal study for 
the period 1980s-1990s based on 
qualitative data from four city 
England 
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Loss of staff engagement and motivation. Loss 
of skills and local knowledge 
councils. 
Jang  
(2006) 
No difference in overall expenditures for park 
and recreation services between municipalities 
contracting out all services to profit-seeking 
firms and municipalities providing services in-
house. Lower expenditure on services found for 
municipalities contracting out to non-profit or 
other public providers. 
For negative effects: 
Transactional risks (difficulties 
with service measurability and 
monitoring). 
For positive effects: Economy of 
scale, sufficient competition. 
Statistical analysis (OLS regression 
with controls) of available register 
and secondary survey data (year 
1997) from 1055 municipalities.    
USA 
Lindholst 
(2008) 
Improved technical efficiency (34%) and 
improved managerial effectiveness in the initial 
implementation of contracting out. Thereafter 
only small cost effects in additional 
procurements.  
Abolition of former in-efficient 
in-house organization. Stronger 
management instruments (‘high 
powered incentives’). 
Embedded (longitudinal) case study 
of development in the period 1998-
2006 of contract management in 
one state authority based on 
quantitative (accounts) and 
qualitative (interview) data for six 
maintenance contracts. 
Denmark 
Nuppenau 
(2009) 
Internal decentralization of operational 
decision-making and responsibilities. 
Differential staff experiences (adapting to 
contract management as both difficult and 
stimulating). Creation of common goals and 
common spirit / cultural change. Improved 
technical efficiency 
Marketization as a locally driven 
and adaptive organizational 
change process. Exposure to 
competitive pressures drives 
change. 
Retrospective longitudinal case-
study based on interview data of 
marketization in the period 1980-
2005 six municipalities with 
different characteristics. 
Denmark 
Lindholst 
et al.  
(2015) 
Improved technical efficiency. Decreased 
allocative efficiency. Increased control 
orientation in management. Limited outlook on 
service provision and development in planning 
and management 
Institutionalization and 
domination of a ‘technical 
language’, based on 
standardizations for defining and 
managing services.  
Case-study of the use of service 
standards based on analysis of 
existing literature / studies.  
Denmark 
Bretzer et 
al. (2016) 
Average cost saving around 2 % found for 39 
cases. Unchanged or increased costs are more 
likely outcomes than cost savings. The likelihood 
for cost savings is greater the first or second 
time services are contracted out compared to 
the third time or more 
Some indication that cost savings 
of contracting out are more likely 
in metropolitan areas (compared 
to rural) and in municipalities 
with high spend per capital on 
services.  
Descriptive statistical analysis with 
simple tests based on survey data 
(year 2015) of park maintenance 
services from 115 municipalities. 
Sweden 
Leiren et 
al. (2016) 
Substantial increases in cost levels. Lower 
satisfaction with the performance of private 
Private contractors are mainly 
used for provision of services 
Descriptive statistical analysis with 
simple tests based on survey data 
Norway 
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contractors compared to in-house provision for 
cost, development and long term objectives. 
Similar satisfaction levels for quality, flexibility 
and follow-up and problem-solving.  
municipalities cannot provide 
themselves, i.e. not for assuring 
low costs (or other purposes). 
Competition is weak in some 
regions. 
(year 2015) on park (and road) 
maintenance services from 95 
municipalities. 
Dempsey 
et al. 
(2016) 
High degree of satisfaction with cost and quality 
of private provision. 
Some indication that higher 
satisfaction with cost are 
correlated with using contractors 
to achieve cost efficiency well as 
higher satisfaction was reported 
for municipalities with higher 
levels of contracting out  
Descriptive statistical analysis 
based on survey data (year 2015) 
on park (and road) maintenance 
services from 103 local 
governments. 
England 
Note: Table based on a literature search on outcomes from contracting out park and green space maintenance. 
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TABLE 2. Qualitative summary of reported instances of positive, neutral or negative outcomes from contracting out park and green space maintenance  
Outcome Positive Neutral Negative 
Economic (11 studies) 8 3 1 
Service (8 studies) 1 4 4 
Management / organization (5 studies) 5 0 2 
Staff (5 studies) 1 0 5 
Note:  A study can report more than one type of outcome as well as both positive, neutral and negative outcomes (i.e. the sum of positive, neutral and 
negative outcomes can be greater than the number of studies). Relative frequencies are not calculated due to the low number of studies.  
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TABLE 3. Summary of reported associations between four types of contracting outcomes and hypothetical explanations 
Explanation  Economic Service  
Management / 
organization 
Staff 
Introduction of competition  + ÷ + / ÷ ÷ 
Private ownership / management + ÷ + ÷ 
Shift toward lower service levels + ÷ - - 
Low costs as government objective  + ÷ - ÷ 
Change in managerial thinking / tools + + / ÷ + ÷ 
Note:  Table based inspection of explanations for outcomes provided in 13 studies of contracting out grounds maintenance.  
Legend: + = mainly positive association, ÷ = mainly negative association, - = no association reported, + / ÷ = highly mixed associations reported 
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